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Abstract 
 
During routine inspections of the Space Shuttle’s Main Propulsion System Liquid Oxygen (LO2) pre-valve, 
the mechanism provided to maintain the valve in the open position was found cracked. The mechanism is 
a Vespel roller held against the valve visor by a stack of Belleville springs. The roller has been found 
cracked 3 times. All three instances were in the same valve in the same location. There are 6 pre-valves 
on each orbiter, and only one has exhibited this problem. Every-flight inspections were instituted and the 
rollers were found to be cracked after only one flight. Engineers at Marshall Space Flight Center, Johnson 
Space Center, and Kennedy Space Center worked together to determine a solution. There were several 
possible contributors to the failure:  a misaligned visor, an out-of-specification edge with a sharp radius, 
an out-of-specification tolerance stack up of a Belleville spring stack that caused un-predicted loads on 
the Vespel SP-21 roller, and a dimple machined into the side of the roller to indicate LO2 compatibility that 
created a stress riser. The detent assembly was removed and replaced with parts that were on the low 
side of the tolerance stack up to eliminate the potential for high loads on the detent roller. After one flight, 
the roller was inspected and showed fewer signs of wear and no cracks. 
 
Introduction 
 
NASA’s Space Shuttle is propelled into orbit by two solid rocket boosters and three Space Shuttle Main 
Engines (SSMEs). The SSMEs are liquid rocket engines that use liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as 
propellant. The propellant is stored in the non-reusable external tank. During loading, the propellants flow 
through the orbiter by way of the fill and drain system on the Main Propulsion System. The propellants are 
loaded in this manner in order to cool down the various Main Propulsion System fluid components and to 
chill the engines. This prevents gas ingestion by the engines during ignition. 
 
The Main Propulsion System contains various sub-systems including the feed system. The feed system 
allows flow of oxidizer and propellant from the external tank to the three SSME’s. After the feed system 
manifold, there are three pre-valves that are used for isolation of the propellant supply from the SSME’s. 
These pre-valves are used to prevent catastrophic failures of the oxidizer turbo pump during nominal 
engine shutdown as well as during a contingency situation when engine isolation is necessary. Because 
of these important tasks, the pre-valves are inspected and tested routinely.  
 
Valve Function 
 
Each Space Shuttle Main Engine has two 30.5-cm (12-inch) diameter propellant isolation valves. One 
valve is in the liquid hydrogen system and the other in the liquid oxygen (LO2) system. They are referred 
to as pre-valves and are located in the Main Propulsion System. The pre-valves are used during all 
phases of the shuttle operation:  fill and drain of the external tank, ascent, and in contingency situations. 
The primary purpose of the pre-valves is to stop the flow of propellant to the SSME’s in the case of an 
engine failure or shutdown. The restriction of flow reduces the likelihood of an uncontained fire in the aft 
compartment or engine. The LO2 pre-valves also serve a critical purpose during Main Engine Cut Off 
(MECO). During MECO, helium is injected from the SSME pogo accumulator into the area upstream of 
the high-pressure oxidizer turbo pump (HPOT). This maintains the proper pressure for shutdown of the 
HPOT and allows for safe engine shutdown. The pre-valves close, providing the sealing force to maintain 
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the pressure and limit the volume that must be pressurized. The valves also allow the recirculation pumps 
to operate to chill the engines prior to launch. In order to prevent overpressure of the feedlines, the valve 
contains a reverse flow relief valve and a visor liftoff mechanism.  
  
The pre-valves are pneumatically actuated, bi-stable, two-position valves. The valve has a half-moon-
shaped inconel visor that seals against a Kel-F seat in the closed position. A photo of the valve between 
the open and closed positions is shown in Figure 1. To open the valve, helium is supplied to an actuator 
that rotates the visor out of the propellant flow path. When the valve opens, two Belleville spring-loaded 
mechanisms hold a small roller in detent grooves on each side of the visor to ensure the visor remains in 
the fully open position. These detent mechanisms serve as a mechanical latch to hold the valve in the 
open position to prevent an unwanted closure of the valve during engine operation. Because the valve is 
bi-stable, the detent mechanisms add redundancy to the valve. Helium is again supplied to the opposite 
side of the valve actuator piston to close the valve.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1:  Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System Pre-Valve 
 
 
 
Pre-valve Detent Mechanism Description 
 
The detent mechanisms are composed of several piece parts as shown in the cross sectional and 
exploded views in Figures 2 and 3. The assembly contains a roller, pin, and follower that allow the 
mechanism to translate across the visor. The assembly also contains a stack of Belleville springs and 
spacers. The springs allow for vertical movement of the roller. The spacers protect the springs from 
rubbing on one another and allow the springs to invert.   
 
The detent roller is manufactured from LO2/LH2 compatible Vespel SP-21. As the valve opens, the part of 
the visor known as the ramp comes into contact with the roller compressing the Belleville spring stack in 
the detent mechanism. The roller travels along the ramp to the detent groove, shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 
shows the valve in the open position with the roller locked in the detent groove. Rotation of the visor itself 
is controlled by mechanical stops in the actuator that do not allow the visor to rotate more than 90 
degrees. The stop also prevents the roller from rolling through the groove and out the other side. As the 
roller moves up the ramp, the follower also moves up. This upward motion compresses the Belleville 
spring stack. As the stack is compressed, the spacers slide within the detent cap guiding the entire 
stack’s motion. They also keep the four Bellevilles from contacting each other as each is compressed so 
that they can move beyond the point where they invert. The top spacer contacts a lip on the cap and 
transmits the force of stack deflection through the cap and into the seven bolts holding the mechanism 
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within the valve body. The cap retains a static spring energized seal in the valve body that prevents 
propellant leakage into the aft compartment of the Orbiter. When the valve is commanded closed, the 
actuation force generated overcomes the force generated by the roller in the groove and compresses the 
spring stack until the roller is forced out of the detent groove. The roller then rolls down the visor ramp 
until the two parts are no longer in contact with each other. In the closed position, the detent Belleville’s 
are only compressed to their installation height and the roller and follower hang inside the valve. The 
follower has a large land that contacts the retainer to hold it in place. The retainer serves multiple 
purposes:  it prevents the follower and spring stack from falling into the valve and ensures the spring 
stack is compressed to the installation height before coming into contact with the visor, the retainer is 
keyed within the cap to prevent the mechanism from being installed in a manner where the roller and 
detent groove would not line up, and the retainer prevents the follower from pivoting or rotating as the 
roller moves up the visor ramp.   
 
 
Figure 2:  Cross-section of the detent mechanism 
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Figure 3:  Exploded view of the different detent mechanism’s piece parts 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Pre-valve Visor 
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Figure 5:  Roller locked in the detent grove when the valve is in the open position 
 
Detent Mechanism Inspections 
 
During an inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) after the vehicle’s second flight, one of the detent rollers in the 
engine 3 LO2 pre-valve was found to have a crack through the full thickness and down one third the 
length of the part. The root cause of the crack was not found and the crack was dismissed as a one-time 
occurrence. However, as part of the forward plan, the requirement to inspect each roller during every 
vehicle’s Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP) was instituted. During every OMDP, all six LO2 and 
LH2 detent mechanisms are removed from the pre-valves and inspected for wear or damage. Each roller 
typically shows a washboard pattern around its circumference that is considered nominal wear. This 
pattern is due to the large visor swinging and contacting the motionless roller. Because the surface of the 
visor is relatively rough and the visor moves at a fast rate, it is suspected that the roller does not roll 
smoothly across the visor. The slipping of the roller may contribute to the “wash board” wear marks that 
are typically seen around the roller.   
 
As the Belleville spring is compressed, the roller is forced against the retainer that results in wear on the 
roller. Also, there are typically black indications on the retainer where this contact takes place. The black 
marks indicate deposits of Vespel material were transferred from the roller surface to the retainer.   
 
Some rollers within the fleet are specially machined to have a smaller diameter in specific locations. The 
purpose of this process is to reduce the effect of rough or high spots on that specific valve’s visor. During 
inspections after the initial flights of the OV-103 and OV-104, several rollers in the LH2 and LO2 systems 
were found with rough gouges at specific distances along their lengths. Borescope and visual inspections 
concluded these instances of damage were due to wear associated with the high spots on each visor. 
Two rollers showing this type of damage are shown in Figure 6. Examples of specially machined rollers 
with gaps to avoid a high spot on a discrepant visor are shown in Figure 7.   
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Rollers Exhibiting Wear due to High or Rough Spots on the Visor 
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Figure 7:  Drawings showing how these rollers are machined to avoid discrepant areas  
on valve visors 
 
In addition to roller wear, the retainers also show signs of wear due to contact from the side of the 
follower. Deposits of the retainer material have been found on the pin and follower, which further supports 
the theory that the retainer is being damaged by these components. The cap also shows signs of wear 
due to the sliding contact of the four spring spacers. Example of nominal wear associated with spacer 
travel in the cap can be seen in Figure 8. All parts of the assembly are inspected thoroughly and replaced 
if the wear is considered significant. Minor wear to metal parts may be treated with Chem-film which is an 
acceptable practice for Shuttle LO2 and LH2 systems. 
 
 
Figure 8:  Cap showing signs of nominal wear due to spacer rubbing 
 
 
Cracked Roller Anomaly 
 
To date, three cracked rollers have been found through inspection. All 3 rollers were in the OV-104 
Engine 3 LO2 pre-valve. The first cracked roller was found after the second flight of OV-104, which led to 
the inspections discussed above. During OMDP for OV-104 after Flight 26, the second cracked roller was 
discovered. Following this investigation, every-flight inspections were instituted for the specific Engine 3 
LO2 pre-valve. During these inspections, the third cracked roller was discovered. Unlike the prior two 
cracked rollers, this roller cracked after only one flight. This raised concerns that a cracked roller that 
remains in service may degrade further and cause a serious failure in the LO2 system. 
 
A cracked roller may liberate debris. This debris should be captured by the pre-valve screen, which is a 
1000-micron screen downstream of the pre-valve to prevent contamination from entering the engine. 
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Another failure mode is that if the roller completely fails and the metal follower comes in contact with the 
pre-valve visor, an ignition source would be created in the highly volatile LO2 environment.  
 
After the second failure was discovered, two likely causes were identified:  roller material LO2 
ompatibility testing marks, and detent groove leading edge sharpness. Before a soft good or non-
with a dimple has reduced fracture toughness. However, 
uring this testing, the loads required to crack a roller were less than the estimated loads imparted by the 
r 
ould be taken. It was determined that the radius of the lip of the leading edge of the detent groove was 
 of the leading 
dge was slightly higher than the other. This resulted in an unparallelism between the roller and visor 
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metallic material is used in Space Shuttle LO2 systems, each batch of the material must be compatibility 
tested. The Vespel SP21 used for the roller requires this testing. To ensure that rollers that aren’t batch 
tested are not installed in the vehicle, a small dimple is machined into the end of the roller to indicate that 
the material successfully completed the required testing. The depth and diameter of the dimple are 
drawing controlled. The mark is to be no more than 0.76-mm (0.030-inch) deep and 1.57 mm (0.062 inch) 
in diameter. It was noted that the crack observed on the second and third cracked rollers initiated at the 
dimple and propagated through the thickness of the roller. The dimple was identified as a stress riser and 
a contributor to the cracked rollers. However, it was also noted that the first cracked roller did not have a 
dimple, so there is likely an additional cause.   
 
Testing was performed to verify that a roller 
d
Belleville spring stack in a nominal assembly. This information prompted further investigation after the 
third roller was found cracked. The original intent of the testing was only to prove that the dimple did 
affect the fracture toughness of the roller. The testing was performed at ambient conditions. The load 
required to crack a dimple-less roller was twice that of the load required to crack a roller with a dimple.   
 
Molds of the visor detent groove were made so that measurements of the key dimensions of the viso
c
sharper for this particular valve visor than drawings for the part allowed. The edge radius underwent a 
grinding and polishing process with the valve installed on the vehicle. Prior to machining, the radius was 
found to vary between 0.13 to 0.51 mm (0.005 to 0.020 inch) at various points along the length of the 
detent groove. The drawing requirement for this radius was 0.38 to 0.76 mm (0.015 to 0.030 inch). After 
the procedure, the sharpest dimension found along the length of the detent leading edge was 0.48 mm 
(0.019 inch). The polishing process was performed between the second and third rollers.   
 
It was also noted from the mold impressions that the one end (labeled as “5” in Figure 9)
e
interface. This unparallelism resulted in one side of the leading edge being approximately 0.64 mm (0.025 
inch) higher than the other. This meant that one end, the horseshoe shaped end, compressed the detent 
roller more than the open end. All three cracks initiated on the end corresponding to the higher 
compression. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Pre-valve Visor Detent Groove 
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Rationale to fly after finding the second cracked roller was based primarily on the conclusion that the 
sharp leading edge of the detent groove was the root cause of the cracking. However, after the detent 
groove leading edge was returned to print, the third roller cracked after only one flight. The second and 
third cracked rollers can be seen in Figure 10. In each case, the crack was observed to run through the 
LO2 compatibility testing mark and completely through the thickness of the roller. This can be seen in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10:  The second and third cracked rollers 
 
Figure 11:  Crack can be seen through the compatibility testing mark and from the  
 
 
inner to outer diameters 
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During further examination of all available data it was noted that the visor to valve body height, recorded 
during the visor mold impression and grinding work, was out of family. This information kicked off a 
tolerance stack up analysis. The third cracked roller kicked-off an effort for a more in-depth investigation 
of alternate causes. Because the first two causes that were examined, the dimple and the sharp edge, did 
not preclude another cracked roller, it was necessary to look for a less obvious cause. Because the third 
failure was after only one flight, resources and attention not previously available were given to the 
problem. 
 
The out-of-specification measurement of the visor height prompted the tolerance stack-up investigation. 
The measured distance of the visor from the valve body was used as a basis for a tolerance stack-up 
analysis. Actual measurements of the installed detent mechanism components were used, including a 
force-deflection curve of the Belleville spring stack set-up. The stack up of the individual components was 
subtracted from the visor height to determine if interference was possible. Interference would result in the 
spring stack reaching its solid height and imparting unexpected high loads on the roller. It was determined 
that combinations of nominal piece parts tolerances could result in deflections that caused the Belleville 
spring stack to go flat and introduce the high loads onto the roller. An illustration of the mechanism and 
the measurements used in the analysis are shown in Figure 12. As a solution, piece parts were carefully 
selected to produce an acceptable assembly on the low side of the tolerance band. This should preclude 
the spring stack from reaching a solid deflection height. Further mitigation was to machine an angle in the 
retainer surface that contacts the follower. The surface was angled to 2 degrees based on the marks left 
by the roller on the retainer. These marks indicated the angle at which the roller was moving when in 
contact with the visor. The modified retainer allows additional movement of the follower and prevents 
binding at the follower-retainer interface. This reduction in binding also reduces the load being applied to 
roller. 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Detent Mechanism Tolerance Stackup 
105
